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Abstract:  
While anti-nuclear weapons activism in Britain and other nations has received 
considerable historiographical attention, its transnational professional dimensions 
have so far been neglected. This article thus introduces the concept of “transnational 
professional activism” as a new lens onto anti-nuclear weapons activism. 
“Transnational professional activism” is here taken to mean the ways in which 
scientific and medical professionals, driven by professional ethos and etiquette, 
expertise, as well as based on their self-fashioned expert identities, organized 
themselves into national interest groups that worked within wider transnational 
networks to act against the perceived threat that nuclear war posed to human society. 
Through a comparative analysis of the efforts by two key groups of atomic scientists 
 2 
and medical professionals to prevent nuclear war at two key moments of the Cold 
War in Britain, the first Western European nation to acquire nuclear arms, this study 
examines shifts in the nature of transnational professional activism. In this, it 
expounds chief aspects in the roles that scientists and medical professionals played in 
anti-nuclear weapons activism. The Atomic Scientists’ Association with its promotion 
of the international control of nuclear energy from 1945 to 1948 and the Medical 
Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons, which analyzed the anticipated medical effects 
of nuclear war in the years from 1980 to 1985, are at the center of this analysis.  
Text of Article:  
The presence of nuclear weapons, coupled with periods of increased tensions between 
the superpowers in the Cold War, had a profound impact on the ways in which 
scientific and medical professionals acted within British and other national societies, 
fashioned their professional identities, calibrated their moral compasses, and formed 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in science and medicine to prevent the 
outbreak of nuclear war. These groups often operated within larger networks that 
transcended national boundaries, inclusive of the geopolitical and ideological fault 
lines of the Cold War. Yet, historians have largely overlooked the crucial roles that 
professionals (scientific, medical, and other) have played in anti-nuclear weapons 
activism.1 
 This article focuses on these neglected transnational professional dimensions 
of scientists’ and medical professionals’ work for the prevention of nuclear war by 
introducing the concept of “transnational professional activism” as a new lens onto 
anti-nuclear weapons activism. “Transnational professional activism” is taken here to 
mean the ways in which scientists and medical professionals, driven by professional 
ethos and etiquette, expertise, as well as based on their self-fashioned expert 
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identities, organized themselves into national interest groups that worked within wider 
transnational networks to act against the perceived threat that nuclear war posed to 
human society. 2 In this, the present article draws inspiration from work on 
professionalism, professional identities, and expertise more generally, as well as from 
transnational activism (often focusing on human rights or environmental concerns), 
NGOs, the public health movement, and medical activism and inequity.3 However, it 
does not attempt to gauge the impact of transnational professional activism – a 
problematic task – but is rather concerned with the ways in which it manifested itself 
and changed over the course of the Cold War. 
For heuristic purposes, this study focuses on two stages in the development of 
transnational professional anti-nuclear weapons activism in Britain, the first Western 
European nation to acquire atomic arms, in the Cold War. Through an exploration of 
the attempts by two key British occupational groups to prevent nuclear war at two 
crucial moments of that conflict, it demonstrates how transnational professional 
activism shifted during the Cold War, thereby expounding chief aspects of the roles 
that professionals played in anti-nuclear weapons activism. The Atomic Scientists’ 
Association (ASA), as the chief body of nuclear scientists in Britain between 1946 
and 1959 and its promotion of the international control of atomic energy from 1945 to 
1948, and the Medical Campaign Against Nuclear Weapons (MCANW), as the main 
group of concerned medical professionals and its study of the anticipated medical 
effects of nuclear war during the early 1980s, are at the center of this analysis.  
 Despite differences in their members’ disciplinary backgrounds and the 
historical contexts in which they operated, the ASA and MCANW shared some 
ideologies and motivations. In their approaches to transnational professional activism, 
the two organizations resembled “progressive professionals,” as Christopher Moores 
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classifies activist professionals who positioned themselves tactically in-between non-
political insider pressure groups and more politicized mass movements such as the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND).4 As “progressive professionals,” the 
ASA and MCANW faced similar difficulties in defining the political and operating 
politically – two central characteristics of their anti-nuclear weapons activism. 
Moreover, at a very general level of abstraction, the specter of nuclear war framed 
their actions; for their work for the prevention of nuclear war appeared to be grounded 
in similar moral regimes that originated from their occupational involvement in 
preparations for atomic warfare. If many ASA members contributed to the creation of 
the first atom bombs during the Second World War, many medical professionals – 
albeit in more abstract and hypothetical ways – were involved in civil defense 
planning for future scenarios of nuclear war in the 1980s.  
Yet, as this article shows, the ASA’s and MCANW’s moral regimes differed 
fundamentally from one another, depending on the specific Cold War contexts in 
which they worked for the prevention of nuclear war. To a large extent, this variance 
was the result of different views by the ASA and MCANW of the “nuclear taboo” – 
the non-use of nuclear weapons – that was both a chief motivation for and 
legitimization of their efforts to prevent nuclear war.5 In its quest for the international 
control of nuclear energy, the ASA was active during the transitional period from the 
Second World War to the Cold War, when the United States held a monopoly on 
nuclear weaponry, and the formation of an anti-nuclear weapons mass movement still 
lay about a decade in the future. This period spanned the years from the atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, through the formation of the 
ASA and failed attempts by the United Nations (UN) to establish a system of 
international control of atomic energy in 1946, to the end of these debates and the 
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classification of atomic arms as “weapons of mass destruction” by the UN’s 
Commission for Conventional Armaments in 1948.6 Out of the social responsibility 
that they perceived as having emanated from their wartime work on nuclear arms, 16 
scientists, including Patrick Blackett, Harrie Massey, Marcus Oliphant, Rudolf 
Peierls, and Joseph Rotblat, formed the ASA in March 1946.7 Alongside the 
international control of atomic energy, its chief objectives addressed the public 
information and education on civilian and military aspects of nuclear power, as well 
as advising political decision-makers on these matters. With some 140 full and 500 
associate members at its peak, the ASA remained a relatively small organization 
throughout its time of existence.8  
 By contrast, MCANW engaged in its efforts to prevent nuclear war during the 
so-called Second Cold War from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s. As a consequence 
of rising tensions between the superpowers, the perceived threat of nuclear war 
intensified during these years. Especially in the wake of the “double track” decision 
by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), mass protests against the 
deployment of American intermediate-range nuclear weapons to Britain and other 
NATO member states erupted across Western Europe. British medical professionals 
thus founded MCANW in 1980, based on their professional code of ethics.9 Besides 
the existing Medical Association for the Prevention of War (MAPW), MCANW 
affiliated itself to the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War 
(IPPNW) – the main umbrella organization of the transnational medical movement 
against nuclear war.10 By comparison with the ASA, MCANW represented a much 
larger membership that grew from about 1,100 in October 1981 to some 3,500 by 
September 1985.11 Focusing on MCANW’s main area of expertise (the investigation 
into the anticipated medical effects of nuclear war), this study traces MCANW’s 
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activities in the period from its formation in 1980 until 1985 when the group started to 
widen its agenda beyond this single programmatic issue. Consequently, it 
demonstrates how, by the early 1980s, transnational professional anti-nuclear 
weapons activism had shifted since 1948 and continued to shift during the 1980s.12  
Foundations of Transnational Professional Activism 
A set of organizational and ideological pillars that formed the foundations of the 
ASA’s and MCANW’s quest to avert nuclear war is crucial for understanding their 
actions. While some of these evolved independently of the Cold War framework and 
followed their own logic, the Cold War rendered some of these ideological and 
organizational foundations of transnational professional activism political and brought 
the ASA and MCANW into conflict with British government interests, as will be 
shown below. On a conceptual level, the ASA’s and MCANW’s anti-nuclear weapons 
activism dovetailed with Harold Perkin’s notions of “professional society” and 
“professional elites.” In particular their self-fashioning of expert identities contained 
elements of Perkin’s “professional society,” which was characterized by a marked 
preference of experts over the untrained and the unskilled.13 In order to maintain their 
standing as “professional elites,” the ASA and MCANW embodied “thought 
collectives,” disseminating specific scientific and medical “thought styles.”14 
Ultimately, these “thought collectives” contributed to what Peter Haas terms 
transnational “epistemic communities,” that is knowledge-based expert networks that 
served these two organizations as communication links for the proliferation of 
information relevant to their causes.15 
The ASA’s and MCANW’s self-fashioned identities as expert organizations 
formed part of modernization and professionalization processes that took place in 
post-war Britain and that radically improved the societal standing of experts and the 
 7 
role of professional ethics. A trend toward stronger secularization of British society 
that replaced faith with expertise as one of the fundamental tenets of the work of 
NGOs contributed to this shift. By focusing on single issues like the international 
control of nuclear energy or the medical consequences of nuclear war, the ASA and 
MCANW pragmatically positioned themselves as expert authorities on these 
matters.16  
To safeguard their elite status as experts, a stringent politics of exclusion was 
at work within the two organizations. While CND and other groups of the anti-nuclear 
weapons mass movement accepted members from all professional backgrounds, the 
ASA’s and MCANW’s membership delineated along occupational lines. The ASA 
only admitted “atomic scientists” to full membership status. Although MCANW was, 
according to its constitution, “open to all health care workers and students of the 
health care professions,” physicians dominated the group in practice. In an attempt to 
generate additional funds without jeopardizing their standing as expert organizations, 
the ASA and MCANW permitted non-experts – groups and individuals – to affiliate 
to their organizations as “associate members” or “Friends of MCANW” 
respectively.17  
The ASA and MCANW also used their status as “professional elites” to gain 
access to high-level political decision-makers and to inform or educate the public 
about their objectives. Some of MCANW’s and the ASA’s strategies to promote their 
agendas resembled those of the broader anti-nuclear weapons movement, albeit 
through a top-down approach. This applied to their attempts to build “societal 
pressure,” as Nina Tannenwald generally observes, by “identifying problems, 
providing information, framing issues, and shaping discourse.”18 To these ends, the 
ASA sought to recruit “useful people” in leading positions in the clergy, unions, 
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higher education, or other important societal roles as “associate members.”19 A 
similar, publicity-oriented approach that was common to NGO work, also motivated 
the election of John Humphrey, a well-renowned immunologist, as MCANW’s first 
president.20  
Apart from publicity, the status of nuclear scientists and medical professionals 
as independent experts also located them in a powerful position of intermediaries 
between the British state and society.21 The ASA members Patrick Blackett, Sir John 
Cockcroft, and Sir George Thomson, for example, used their membership in the 
governmental Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy to promote the association’s 
objectives to high-ranking government officials.22 In a similar fashion, a 
programmatic article by IPPNW co-founder Bernard Lown and others referred to an 
altruistic “educational role in society on all issues pertinent to health and life” that 
medical professionals occupied. Together with their high-level analytical skills, this 
marked a chief prerequisite for them to “make up a natural constituency – a 
potentially forceful, non-political pressure group” to work for the prevention of 
nuclear war.23 In line with this self-perceived educational role and based on their 
professional expertise, the application of a preventative medical approach, as a form 
of prophylaxis, to the nuclear arms race became a chief characteristic of MCANW’s 
activism to avert nuclear war. This found expression in so-called medical 
prescriptions that the group frequently issued as diagnosis of and remedy for the 
nuclear arms race in conjunction with IPPNW.24  
Alongside professional exclusivity, a struggle with defining the limits of the 
political influenced the ways in which MCANW and the ASA fashioned their 
professional identities as independent experts. Where British intellectuals such as 
philosopher Bertrand Russell often perceived of themselves as “public moralists” 
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from the nineteenth century onward, the ASA and MCANW adopted an ambiguous 
approach of supposedly objective scientific investigation to political matters.25 On a 
basic level, a universal ideology of objective (but often subjective) science, shared by 
scientific and medical experts around the world, informed this concept. Its 
practitioners applied principles of scientific investigation and medical diagnosis to 
social and political issues.26  
The concomitant of a self-fashioned professional identity as an objective 
expert organization was the risk of a substantial loss of credibility owing to a failure 
to take definite political positions, for either overtly politicized or blatantly neutral 
statements could impinge upon the trustworthiness of the ASA and MCANW as 
independent and objective expert authorities.27 And it appeared that finding the right 
balance between objectivity and politicization proved to be an existential question that 
could potentially jeopardize the existence of expert activist groups. Consequently, 
MCANW’s and the ASA’s objective approaches to political matters were not 
undisputed amongst their members. Internal discussions often centered on the 
decisive role that trust in authority, as a crucial underlying prerequisite of their 
objective scientific and medical expertise, played in the formation of their members’ 
identities as professional activists.28 That such groups commonly faced anti-
intellectualism further complicated their work.29  
The ASA’s and MCANW’s reliance on objectivity lay partly rooted in 
multiple allegiances held by some of their members. Since the boundaries separating 
members’ different – and at times conflicting – loyalties were often fluid, a de-
politicized approach frequently forced itself upon such professional activist 
organizations to avoid members’ conflicts of interest.30 The roles that Cockcroft and 
other ASA officers simultaneously held in the association and government 
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employment prompted the group on numerous occasions to steer away from 
politicized motions to avoid loyalty clashes. But this entanglement with the 
government also led the ASA to compromise its independence: in an attempt to build 
rapport with government offices, the group forwarded statements on contentious 
issues to the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority, the government agency in 
charge of nuclear energy, for approval ahead of their publication.31 In MCANW’s 
case, community physicians found themselves in a situation that was comparable to 
that of government employees in the ASA because these medical professionals 
participated in government planning for civil defense.32 
At the same time, questions of partiality versus impartiality reflected constant 
dilemmas and tensions between national and international allegiances that scientists 
had faced at least since the late nineteenth century and that repeatedly brought them 
into conflict with national governments.33 In postwar Britain, NGOs like MCANW 
and the ASA often occupied a difficult and ambivalent position, as Hilton and others 
observe, being “at one and the same time a wing of the state, and an agent acting 
against it.” The Cold War context often exacerbated these tensions. The ASA 
encountered criticism from the British government because of its internationalist 
outlook that defied British national security interests. Whitehall was particularly 
skeptical of the association’s strong support for the freedom of science across national 
boundaries, one of the chief underlying principles of ASA proposals for the 
international control of nuclear energy. Similarly, MCANW – as an affiliate of 
IPPNW – was subject to accusations of being a pro-Soviet organization because of its 
striving for the prevention of nuclear war across the blocs. In part, the ASA’s and 
MCANW’s difficulties in their relationships with the British government stemmed 
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from a divergence between self- versus external perceptions of their intentions and 
objectives.34 
The ASA’s adherence to the principle of objectivity and its refusal to adopt a 
political stance was one of the association’s chief characteristics, distinguishing it not 
only from key organizations of the atomic scientists’ movement in the United States, 
especially the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), but also contributing to its 
demise and disbandment.35 Together with ideological motivations, pragmatic reasons 
were behind the ASA’s objective approach, especially the grass-roots democratic 
decision-making process in its governing council that required unanimous 
agreement.36 In addition, councilors’ opposing political views and loyalties, as well as 
an increasing polarization of the scientific community into government loyalists and 
critics during the early Cold War aggravated these tensions. As a result, the ASA 
came close to impose a depoliticized approach upon itself to ensure its continued 
functionality.37  
MCANW shared some key features of political objectivity with the ASA, 
vowing in its constitution to be “independent of any political party” and defining itself 
as a “reference agency for the information” on the medical effects of atomic warfare. 
Unlike the ASA, MCANW followed a more pragmatic approach to decision-making 
through the adoption of a two-thirds majority vote. Its governing National Council 
could “initiate policy decisions” that were then subject to approval by a two-third 
majority at the subsequent annual general meeting.38 And this gave MCANW 
flexibility to react to current developments. But the ASA and MCANW followed 
different paths into the political terrain. 
The ASA and the International Control of Nuclear Energy, 1945-48 
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The ASA and its efforts to prevent nuclear war through the promotion of the 
international control of nuclear energy occurred during a formative period of 
transnational professional anti-nuclear weapons activism that bridged the final phases 
of the Second World War and the early Cold War. During these years, the “nuclear 
taboo” was still evolving. While many Britons accepted the use of the atomic bombs 
against Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, concerns over the deployment of 
nuclear weaponry grew over the next five years. Particularly the classification of 
atomic arms as “weapons of mass destruction” in a different category from 
conventional armaments, by the UN in 1948 represented a decisive moment in the 
establishment of the concept of the non-use of nuclear weapons.39 The ASA’s views 
on nuclear arms reflected the embryonic nature of the “nuclear taboo” in this period: 
the association did not object to the existence of nuclear arms and the concept of 
nuclear deterrence per se but contended, in 1946, in vague terms that “[t]he problem 
of outlawing atomic warfare [wa]s in the last analysis identical with the problem of 
outlawing war in general.”40 In line with these views, the group set out to prevent 
nuclear war through proposals for the establishment of an international control regime 
for nuclear energy. 
The ASA’s activism coincided with the emergence of a new wave of 
internationalism. The recent experiences of two world wars and severe economic 
problems served as a catalyst for the creation of international organizations with an 
internationalist agenda – most notably the UN. Ideologically, this postwar 
internationalism built on principles of national self-determination as postulated by 
United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt and British Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill in the Atlantic Charter (1941).41 The presence of nuclear weapons, 
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especially after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, now appeared to make internationalism ever 
more important. 
 With its promotion of international control, the ASA followed an ambivalent 
approach to scientific internationalism. The group tapped into traditions of British 
liberal internationalist thinking from the interwar years and shared key foundations of 
scientific internationalism, including the transnational exchange of scientific 
knowledge, with other groups of the atomic scientists’ movement, on the one hand.42 
Simultaneously, the ASA’s agenda contained elements of what Joseph Manzione calls 
“bipolar scientific internationalism,” on the other. The latter found expression in the 
ASA’s prevailing transnational engagement with Western scientists such as the FAS 
and its predominantly anti-Communist orientation.43 Like the FAS in the United 
States, the presence of Stalinism dissuaded the ASA from building closer ties with 
scientists in the Soviet Union.44 
Partly as a consequence of its pro-Western leaning, the ASA operated within 
relatively rudimentary “transnational advocacy networks” with groups like the 
Atomic Scientists of Chicago, the FAS, and the National Committee of Atomic 
Information in the United States.45 The absence of an IPPNW-style umbrella 
organization that spanned the two blocs, in the ASA’s case, perhaps marked the most 
striking organizational difference between the association and MCANW. With a view 
to international control, the ASA collaborated at the national level with the New 
Commonwealth Committee and the UN Association as well as transnationally with 
the FAS. Amongst other things, the ASA and the FAS reprinted each other’s 
statements in their journals, the Atomic Scientists’ News and the FAS-affiliated 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists respectively.46 This served a two-fold purpose for the 
ASA: not only was the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists widely read, but its editor 
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Eugene Rabinowitch believed it could serve as a chief forum for fostering 
internationalism in the early Cold War.47 FAS members also attended the ASA’s first 
major conference in Oxford in July 1946 where proposals for international control 
ranked high on the agenda.48  
Given their little institutionalized form, the “transnational advocacy 
networks,” in which ASA members engaged and which often pre-dated the Second 
World War, relied heavily on individual personal contacts. From 1911, the Solvay 
Conferences provided an important forum for the advancement of the relatively small 
field of theoretical physics, particularly in areas relevant to nuclear science.49 
Research centers represented another site where atomic scientists formed personal 
contacts. At Leipzig University in Germany, for example, the Manhattan Project 
scientists Felix Bloch, Klaus Fuchs, Rudolf Peierls, George Placzek, Edward Teller, 
and Victor Weisskopf had come across each other during the late 1920s and early 
1930s as either colleagues or students of Werner Heisenberg.50  
Where atomic scientists, in their support of internationalism, differed from 
other professional experts was in their moral regimes: many of them grappled with the 
moral responsibilities that stemmed from their involvement in the creation of nuclear 
arms in the British and Allied wartime projects. In particular, Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki forced many Manhattan Project scientists, in the words of Jon Hunner, “to 
culturally code switch” to grasp the atom bomb’s moral, cultural, social, and political 
impacts.51 To some extent, the situation of many nuclear scientists was comparable to 
that of chemists such as Fritz Haber who were involved in the development of 
chemical weapons around the time of the First World War.52 Yet, their wartime roles 
also appeared to give atomic scientists moral authority to speak out as authentic 
insider experts and discuss ways to prevent nuclear war.53 That much public attention 
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and even blame focused on nuclear scientists after Hiroshima and Nagasaki enabled 
them to campaign from a media-effective platform for international control.54  
Apart from providing the moral basis for their professional activism, many 
British Manhattan Project scientists, including future ASA members, also formed 
their initial views on international control during their stay in the United States where 
they directly witnessed the formation of the American atomic scientists’ movement.55 
By September 1945, several of these scientists took a first step toward organizing 
themselves in a group to work for the prevention of nuclear war. In a letter, they 
informed Sir James Chadwick, the head of the British mission to the Manhattan 
Project, of their intention to follow the example of their American colleagues and 
issue a declaration on the significance of international control to the British 
government and media.56 The following month, these ambitions translated into a 
“Memorandum from British Scientists at the Los Alamos Laboratory, New Mexico,” 
which arguably represented the first manifestation of a concerted effort to set up a 
British atomic scientists’ organization. While its signatories did not believe that 
“outlawing” atomic weapons was a feasible choice, they called for international 
control through “an international organisation or arrangement for the avoidance of 
war.”57 Their acknowledgement of the American monopoly on nuclear weapons while 
simultaneously calling for an international body to prevent war displayed elements of 
“bipolar scientific internationalism.” 
British Manhattan Project scientists brought these ideas and influences back 
home with them from the United States. In the fall of 1945, several of them formed 
the Atomic Scientists’ Committee (ASC), the direct precursor to the ASA, under the 
tutelage of the Association of Scientific Workers (AScW) trade union. ASC founding 
members included J.D. Bernal, Patrick Blackett, Eric Burhop, Harrie Massey, Alan 
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Nunn May, Nevill Mott, Marcus Oliphant, Rudolf Peierls, and Joseph Rotblat.58 If the 
AScW had briefly discussed international control within the context of scientists’ 
social responsibilities after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the ASC now devoted more 
attention to the issue, laying some programmatic groundwork for the ASA. In 
November 1945, the committee discussed a “Proposal for the Control of Nuclear 
Energy.” The missive identified nuclear scientists as the actors qualified to “take the 
kind of action required in the time required” and put forth suggestions for an 
international conference on international control, an international atomic scientists’ 
organization, and a “World University” with “an international institute for research on 
near-critical masses.”59 
The ASC believed in the capabilities of the UN to implement and police a 
regime of international control of nuclear energy. It rejected proposals by a group of 
Liverpool scientists led by Joseph Rotblat and Michael Moore for a world 
government and a suspension of any research in nuclear science “until mankind [wa]s 
ready to use scientific achievements for constructive purposes only” in favor of a set 
of alternative propositions by Eric Burhop.60 The latter supported plans drawn up 
during the tripartite meeting of the British, American, and Soviet foreign ministers in 
Moscow in December 1945 – and backed by France, China, and Canada – to establish 
the UN Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC). In addition, Burhop called on all 
nations to abandon plans to obtain nuclear arms, including closing down key research 
facilities, and to accumulate inventories of fissionable raw materials. Scientists were 
to promote international control through international conferences and scientific 
exchange across national boundaries.61  
British atomic scientists remained supportive of the UNAEC after the 
disbanding of the ASC.62 By April 1946, shortly after their re-organization in the 
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ASA, Moon, Oliphant, and Peierls drafted a communiqué on international control for 
submission to the UNAEC. Growing tensions between the superpowers seemed to 
make such a statement all the more important. Yet, ASA members’ divergent political 
views and the release of the “Acheson-Lilienthal Report” in the United States 
complicated the composition of the missive considerably.63  
Like the ASC, the FAS, and the British and United States governments, the 
ASA regarded the UN as the most suitable institution for implementing and 
safeguarding a system of international control.64 But the ASA and the British 
government disagreed over the framework and terms under which such a scheme 
should operate. At the heart of this dispute lay the fact that the association – like the 
FAS, the New Commonwealth Society, and segments of the British news media – 
embraced the so-called Baruch Plan.65  
United States President Harry Truman appointed financier Bernard Baruch to 
present the “Acheson-Lilienthal Plan,” as it was originally called, to the UNAEC’s 
first session in June 1946. These proposals promoted international control across a 
broad range of areas from nuclear weaponry to raw materials such as uranium ore. 
Baruch, however, amended the plan substantially so that it granted the United States 
government the right to continue with its nuclear arms research and veto the plan at 
any time should other nations not implement it properly. Consequently, the Soviet 
Union rejected the “Baruch Plan” in the UN Security Council, and the concept of 
international control practically failed by the summer of 1946, marking the start of a 
nuclear arms race between the superpowers.66  
The ASA’s backing of the “Baruch Plan” revealed both the group’s bipolar 
internationalist orientation and the limits it faced in defining the political. The 
association attempted to abstain from making outwardly political statements on 
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international control. As a consequence, the ASA – unlike the FAS – did not lend its 
support to the “One World” movement, which envisaged a world government as a 
means to put an international control scheme into action.67 Instead, ASA members 
sympathized with Niels Bohr’s supposedly less politicized proposals for an “Open 
World.”68 Toward the end of World War II, the Danish émigré scientist envisaged that 
a nuclear arms race could only be averted, provided that the British, Soviet, and 
United States governments would reach a tri-partite agreement on international 
control prior to nuclear weapons coming into existence and the end of the war.69  
If the Cold War framework rendered Bohr’s wartime proposal political, the 
same applied to the ASA’s support of the “Baruch Plan.” For once, Franklin Lindsay, 
the Executive Officer of the United States Representative to the UNAEC, thanked 
Philip Moon on behalf of Baruch “that on nearly all the basic points your Association 
[wa]s in agreement with the United States policy.”70 Conversely, the ASA’s open 
endorsement of the “Baruch Plan” led British government offices to become 
suspicious of the association’s position on international control. The ASA’s view of 
the UN as “a genuine international super-national body with the will and capacity to 
act as a sort of super state and to override the Governments of sovereign States” 
represented, in the eyes of one Foreign Office official, “the common weakness when 
scientists launch out as prophets in the field of international politics.”71 This critique 
corresponded with internal views held by several British government departments. 
Formally, the Attlee Government sanctioned Washington’s proposals in 1946-47. But 
many British government officials simultaneously harbored feelings of mistrust 
toward the Truman Administration and worried about the negative impact that the 
implementation of the “Baruch Plan” might have on Britain’s civilian and military 
nuclear programs.72 This skepticism formed part of a common reluctance that British 
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governments before and after Attlee have displayed toward surrendering sovereignty 
to supranational bodies. And it increased after the United States Congress had passed 
the MacMahon Act (1946), which cut off Britain from vital American nuclear data.73  
 With negotiations on international control dragging on in the UNAEC until 
May 1948, the issue remained high on the ASA’s agenda.74 The ASA members 
Chadwick, Cockcroft, Massey, Oliphant, Peierls, and Thomson sat on Chatham 
House’s Atomic Energy Study Group. The international relations think tank operated 
the panel between September 1946 and the summer of 1948. Given its members’ 
diverse political views and professional backgrounds, as well as Chatham House’s 
overtly non-political mission, the output from the Atomic Energy Study Group took 
the form of an edited collection of papers that examined the matter from different 
angles, including nuclear physics, politics, and international relations.75  
Although the implementation of a system of international control was 
unfeasible and public opinion on the effectiveness of international organizations in 
stopping the arms race turned more pessimistic, the ASA continued to attach 
significance to that matter.76 And the item featured as a major programmatic message 
in the group’s traveling Atom Train exhibition of 1947-48.77 Moreover, the ASA 
Council decided in July 1947 to set up a study group, comprising Blackett, Mott, 
Oliphant, Peierls, and Skinner.78 The team covered the issue and drafted “non-
controversial” articles on the subject.79 In July 1948, the ASA Council issued a further 
statement that called for international control but acknowledged the fact that this ASA 
objective had practically failed in light of growing tensions between the 
superpowers.80 Recipients included the UN secretary-general, the British and Soviet 
UNAEC representatives, Prime Minister Clement Attlee and other cabinet members, 
as well as the AScW and the editor of Nature.81 The fact that the Economist magazine 
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pointed to weaknesses in the association’s treatment of political issues, calling the 
statement “platitudinous,” and Nature classed it as “lamentably weak,” demonstrated 
the extent to which the ASA’s insistence on objectivity and its concern with 
international control appeared to be increasingly out of touch with the realities of the 
advancing Cold War.82 
MCANW and the Study of the Medical Effects of Nuclear War, 1980-85 
MCANW’s work for the prevention of nuclear war occurred in an entirely different 
context. By the early 1980s, the “nuclear taboo” was fully established, with anti-
nuclear weapons activists now challenging the very notion of nuclear deterrence 
itself. Moreover, MCANW operated at a time of widespread anti-nuclear weapons 
protests.83 When the so-called Second Cold War started in 1979, the United States’ 
monopoly on atomic weapons had been abolished for some 30 years, and Britain had 
long possessed its own independent nuclear deterrent.84  
A set of both international and genuinely British political factors helped to 
initiate the formation of MCANW. Here, MCANW’s case illustrates the relationship 
and dynamics at play between national, transnational, and international issues and 
initiatives within transnational professional anti-nuclear weapons activism.85 Like the 
ASA, but perhaps more demonstratively, MCANW represented a group of “national 
internationalists,” as Holger Nehring classifies organizations with internationalist 
objectives that they view simultaneously from national perspectives.86 First and 
foremost, the global nature of the nuclear threat that transcended national boundaries 
appeared to require a transnational resolution. More specifically, many medical 
professionals registered a number of strategic developments in Britain, the United 
States, and NATO with alarm: in their opinion, the adoption of the concepts of 
“limited nuclear war” and “counterforce” as well as the deployment of cruise missiles 
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to Britain under the terms of the NATO “double track” decision made Britain and 
Europe prime targets in a future nuclear war. In addition, the Thatcher Government’s 
endorsement of the practicability of civil defense and effective medical care during 
and after nuclear war as well as its decision to acquire the submarine-based Trident 
nuclear weapons system caused consternation amongst many British medical 
practitioners. What further appeared to dash hopes for easing tensions between the 
superpowers was the United States Senate’s refusal to ratify the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty II in 1980 in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan 
and the election of staunch anti-Communist leaders in Britain (Margaret Thatcher in 
1979) and the United States (Ronald Reagan in 1980).87  
 Motivated by these developments, medical professionals showed growing 
concern over the rising likelihood of nuclear war and its medical consequences, 
leading to MCANW’s formation. In June 1980, The Lancet published an influential 
editorial that pointed to medical professionals “whose services know no frontiers” as 
quasi predestined transnational actors to “help by resisting or at least questioning the 
fomenting of distrust between nations” in the intensifying Cold War.88 In the fall of 
the same year, Helen Caldicott, the president of the American Physicians for Social 
Responsibility (PSR), played a major role in the foundation of the group when she 
attended a MAPW conference that discussed plans to establish a British version of 
PSR.89 By November 1980, MCANW had come into existence with John Humphrey 
at the helm.90 Alongside PSR (IPPNW was still undergoing its formation and 
consolidation process at this time), the World Disarmament Campaign, which Philip 
Noel-Baker and Fenner Brockway founded in the wake of the resolutions of the UN’s 
First Disarmament Session in 1978, gave another important impulse for the creation 
of MCANW.91 From 1982, MCANW also closely cooperated with like-minded 
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professional groups through its role as a major sponsor of Professions for World 
Disarmament and Development, which constituted a hub for activists from a range of 
professional backgrounds.92 
MCANW shared some objectives, in particular its rejection of the concept of 
nuclear deterrence and, in part, its quest for both multi- and later also unilateral 
British nuclear disarmament, with CND and other groups of the anti-nuclear weapons 
mass movement.93 In spite of these policies and the fact that many MCANW 
members held leftwing political views, the campaign sought to uphold a “separate 
identity” from the broader anti-nuclear weapons movement.94 Eventually, MCANW 
permitted its members to support CND on an individual basis.95 But the group often 
displayed a high degree of ambiguity in its concept of objectivity as through its 
opposition to British, American, and NATO nuclear weapons policies or its backing 
of the women’s peace camp at the Greenham Common air base, where United States 
Air Force cruise missiles were deployed. Other politicized areas included, apart from 
MCANW’s criticism of the Thatcher Government’s medical and civil defense 
planning for nuclear war, the group’s advocacy of nuclear non-proliferation, a 
comprehensive nuclear test ban, and a Nuclear Freeze with the goal of freezing 
existing numbers of nuclear stockpiles.96  
One area where MCANW differed fundamentally from the ASA concerned its 
engagement in more fully formed transnational networks under the aegis of IPPNW, 
an international NGO, which seemed to be better equipped to work for the prevention 
of nuclear war in the Cold War than national ASA-type groups. IPPNW’s 
organizational structure as “a federation” of national affiliates, as IPPNW defined 
itself in its constitution from 1983, characterized this advanced transnational make-
up. An International Council, which comprised representatives from all affiliates, 
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governed IPPNW.97 With their high level of transnationalism that permeated the iron 
curtain, MCANW and IPPNW were also less rooted in “bipolar scientific 
internationalism” than the ASA. 
The evolution of the MCANW/IPPNW network formed part of a longer 
developmental process of transnational medical and scientific activism after 1948. It 
gathered momentum during the nuclear test ban debate of the 1950s when the ASA 
and groups of the atomic scientists’ movement in the United States like the FAS and 
the Committee for Nuclear Information, as well as MAPW warned against the 
environmental and health effects of radioactive fallout from nuclear testing. These 
activities produced two major outcomes: first, they prepared some of the ground for 
the emergence of the first cycle of anti-nuclear weapons activism, particularly CND. 
Second, they led to the creation of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World 
Affairs (PCSWA), which represented a chief transnational forum for nuclear and 
other disarmament issues across the Iron Curtain and influenced the formation of 
IPPNW, in 1957.98 
Within some two years of their inception, IPPNW and the press boasted an 
ambitious comparison of the transnational network with the PCSWA.99 While the 
FAS formed a Committee for Foreign Correspondence to create links with Soviet 
scientists in the late 1940s, it was the PCSWA that established a crucial platform for 
transnational exchanges between scientists in the two blocs about nuclear 
disarmament and other issues.100 The PCSWA benefitted from the death of Soviet 
leader Joseph Stalin and the subsequent “Khrushchev thaw” in the Soviet Union 
because these events now enabled Soviet scientific and medical professionals to 
engage more actively with transnational networks.101  
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In hindsight, IPPNW’s comparison with the PCSWA appears to be justified, 
for the PCSWA marked a crucial step in the development of transnational 
professional anti-nuclear weapons activism, providing an institutional link between 
the ASA and MCANW/IPPNW. Besides serving as a major inspiration for MCANW 
and IPPNW, a connection existed between the ASA and the PCSWA through strong 
staff links. The association cooperated with the PCSWA from their start in 1957. 
When the ASA was drawing its last breath in 1959, Joseph Rotblat, a key player in 
the association and the PCSWA (and later also a supporter of IPPNW), took a leading 
role in establishing closer ties between the two organizations.102 What is more, many 
ASA members joined the PCSWA after their association had disbanded in 1959.103 
Above and beyond organizational links, MCANW, the PCSWA, and the ASA 
shared a set of similar issues around national and international allegiances of their 
members. If the ASA, as a national organization with limited transnational links, had 
already come under criticism from the British government for its internationalism, the 
PCSWA and MCANW, and the latter especially through its affiliation with IPPNW, 
faced a much more complex situation, based on their deep engagement with networks 
that transcended the two blocs. In particular Soviet members, who normally belonged 
to the Soviet Academies of Sciences or Medical Sciences and required government 
approval to attend PCSWA and IPPNW meetings, diluted the composition of these 
two organizations as independent expert bodies. As a consequence, political analyst 
Leonard Schwartz pointed to difficulties in defining whether PCSWA conferences, or 
in fact IPPNW congresses, were “‘officially unofficial or unofficially official’.”104 
But IPPNW’s entanglement with Soviet government institutions also led British 
tabloids like the Daily Express to stigmatize the transnational network as “a bogus 
organisation, doing more for Soviet propaganda than for peace.”105 This accusation 
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exemplified a prejudice that groups of the peace movement often encountered in Cold 
War Britain.106 
MCANW’s transnational activism for the prevention of nuclear war 
manifested itself perhaps in its most visible form through the group’s role within the 
IPPNW “federation,” especially annual international conferences. As in the case of 
the PCSWA, international congresses represented major sites of transnational 
exchanges and communication for IPPNW. Here, IPPNW and the PCSWA followed 
in the tradition of earlier transnational groups of medical peace activists such as 
Joseph Rivière and the International Medical Association against War (1905) or the 
International Medical Association for the Prevention of War (1936).107 
Simultaneously, these meetings were important markers of on-going changes in 
MCANW’s anti-nuclear weapons activism. 
Shortly after IPPNW’s formation in June 1980, plans for its first international 
conference were under way.108 Entitled “Last Aid: the Medical Dimensions of 
Nuclear War,” the first IPPNW World Congress took place near Washington, DC, in 
1981. In light of the perceived imminence of nuclear war, the meeting focused on the 
medical effects of nuclear war and marked an important step in the development of 
transnational medical anti-nuclear weapons activism, particularly the consolidation of 
its main hub and the formulation of an agenda. British delegates included John Boag, 
Jack Fielding, Andrew Haines, and Patricia Lindop.109 In addition, the conference 
helped MCANW to raise its profile within the IPPNW network because the umbrella 
organization accepted a British proposal to hold the subsequent IPPNW conference in 
Cambridge, England.110  
IPPNW’s Second World Congress, which MCANW organized with support 
from MAPW in April 1982, epitomized major shifts in transnational professional anti-
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nuclear weapons activism that had taken place since the days when the ASA 
promoted international control, particularly in response to the intensifying nuclear 
arms race of the Second Cold War, in relation to higher levels of transnational 
engagement, and the articulation of stronger political statements. Sir Douglas Black, 
the president of the Royal College of Physicians, Bernard Lown, and Nikita Blokhin, 
the President of the Soviet Academy of Medical Sciences, co-chaired the Cambridge 
meeting, which was attended by some 200 delegates from over 30 Eastern and 
Western bloc countries and non-aligned nations.111 Although the Argentinian invasion 
of the Falkland/Malvinas Islands on the eve of the conference eclipsed the publicity of 
the event, it still received coverage in the press and medical journals. In fact, 
MCANW effectively used it as an opportunity to launch its first major advertisement 
in the national press.112  
Given the mounting tensions between the superpowers, the conference 
focused on the medical effects that nuclear war might have on the densely populated 
European continent, as the main battlefield, with its high degree of urbanization and 
complex infrastructure.113 Amongst other things, working groups discussed issues 
pertinent to the development of transnational medical activism. These included the 
recruitment of members from all areas of the health services and campaigning at the 
national level, as well as constitutional changes to IPPNW’s governance structure.114  
“An Appeal to the Physicians of Europe,” which delegates issued at the end of 
the Cambridge meeting, addressed the development of the IPPNW network. In 
support of IPPNW’s mission, the missive proposed that physicians across Europe 
should either engage in the work of its existing affiliates or set up new ones. 
Furthermore, it urged them to study the medical effects of nuclear war and 
disseminate related information to the public, the media, and political decision-
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makers. Finally, the statement set out to encourage European health professionals to 
network with their colleagues at home and abroad, a key prerequisite for expanding 
IPPNW.115  
 Another important resolution concerned IPPNW’s programmatic orientation 
as expert organization. In a politicized move that jeopardized the credibility and status 
of IPPNW and its affiliates as objective experts, delegates internationalized the 
“Frankfurt Declaration,” an alternative Hippocratic Oath drawn up by the West 
German IPPNW section, as “A New Physician’s Oath.”116 Although the Hippocratic 
Oath, as an ethical legitimization for medical anti-nuclear weapons activism, was less 
significant for MCANW, which did not even mention it in its constitution, than for its 
American and West German sister organizations or IPPNW, the new pledge went to 
the heart of the fundamental debate over war medicine, thus affecting MCANW.117 
One section of the document that justified physicians’ right to “object to any kind of 
training or advanced training in war medicine and refuse to participate in it” proved 
particularly problematic. Not only did it contravene IPPNW’s policy on objectivity, 
but critics interpreted this as a potential rejection by medical professionals to engage 
in any training for, let alone, partaking in actual medical emergencies, including 
natural catastrophes. In West Germany, the “Frankfurt Declaration” consequently 
prompted calls to revoke signatories’ licenses to practice medicine.118 In Britain, it 
appeared to confirm fears of a politicization of IPPNW, as expressed by John Horder, 
the president of the Royal College of General Practitioners, ahead of the Cambridge 
meeting.119  
These negative reactions to IPPNW and MCANW policies demonstrated the 
extent to which the civil defense issue polarized the medical profession into critics 
and supporters of government policy. Through their roles in civil defense planning, 
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community physicians were at the center of this debate. MCANW’s critique of British 
government plans initially centered on two Home Office policies: the “Protect and 
Survive” civil defense campaign and plans for operating British health services during 
and after nuclear attack in line with the “Home Defence Circular (77) 1” policy 
document.120 The group showed concern about the optimistic assessment of the 
medical consequences of nuclear war by government agencies, especially their 
suggestion that effective civil defense against such an attack was, in principle, 
possible.121 To study the effectiveness of civil defense from a medical point of view, 
MCANW had formed a joint Civil Defence Working Group with MAPW in 1981, 
which published the booklet The Medical Consequences of Nuclear Weapons the 
following year.122  
 In formulating an official line on civil defense, MCANW struggled, once 
again, with defining the political. In November 1982, the group passed resolutions on 
the issue that undermined government policy, declaring that civil defense had “no 
significant effect in protecting the population from direct nuclear attack.” At the same 
time, MCANW was more cautious than the West German IPPNW section in its 
“Frankfurt Declaration” because the group differentiated explicitly between 
unrestricted support for general “disaster planning” and the individual medical 
professional’s right to object “on grounds of conscience” to any “participation in 
planning for nuclear war.”123 Despite these nuances, the British government discarded 
MCANW’s views on civil defense.124 
MCANW’s ambiguous stance on civil defense reflected a growing 
politicization of the civil defense issue within and a resultant politicization of the 
medical profession. The British Medical Association (BMA), the main 
representational body and trade union of medical professionals in Britain, played an 
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important role in this process; for its indecisiveness on civil defense and unilateral 
British nuclear disarmament fueled a discussion within MCANW about the 
campaign’s purpose and political mindedness.125 Central to the BMA’s involvement 
in the civil defense debate was a report by its Board of Science and Education that 
undermined the official government line on civil defense: The Medical Effects of 
Nuclear War concluded that the health services would be unable to cope with the 
consequences of a nuclear attack. After a prolonged debate at the BMA’s 1983 annual 
representative meeting, delegates approved of the report’s findings despite their 
subversive message. Yet, they also acted ambivalently when they voted in favor of the 
BMA’s abstention from taking a political stance in the nuclear debate, that is from 
commenting on government policies “‘concerning the manufacture, testing and 
development of nuclear weapons’.” Instead, the meeting carried a resolution that 
promoted a multilateral nuclear freeze. In this, the 1983 annual representative meeting 
established the groundwork for the BMA’s participation in the nuclear debate of the 
1980s, restricting itself to the provision of factual information and refraining from 
actively supporting MCANW and IPPNW.126  
 At its annual general meeting in June 1983, MCANW followed the BMA’s 
resolution, and delegates decided against the adoption of a unilateral line on British 
nuclear disarmament in order not to alienate members, “even whilst recognizing that 
‘unilateral’ meant taking an initiative.” Instead, the same meeting backed a resolution 
issued by IPPNW’s Third World Congress that urged international governments to 
implement a multilateral freeze on nuclear weapons production, testing, and siting, as 
well as their delivery systems, with the ultimate goal of abolishing atomic arms 
altogether. Furthermore, delegates called on the Thatcher Government to advocate 
such a multilateral freeze in the upcoming UN Special Session on Disarmament and 
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to cancel plans for the purchase of Trident and the deployment of cruise missiles on 
British soil, thereby linking unilateral British with multilateral nuclear 
disarmament.127 
 MCANW’s and the BMA’s prioritization of multi- over unilateral nuclear 
disarmament had pragmatic reasons. Although the early 1980s witnessed an increase 
in perceived fears of nuclear war and a mobilization of the anti-nuclear weapons 
movement, MCANW strode against the tide of public opinion with its anti-nuclear 
weapons activism. The defeat of the Labour Party, which ran on a unilateralist ticket 
in the 1983 general election, at the polls illustrated this demonstratively. While there 
existed short-lived mainstream disapproval of Trident and cruise missiles, a majority 
of Britons, eventually, put up with the deployment of these weapons systems.128 
Multilateralism thus seemed to go down more favorably with mainstream public 
opinion than an orthodox unilateralist stance. 
MCANW continued to follow a more de-politicized line for another year or 
so, before abandoning it by late 1984. This move went hand in hand with a 
diversification of the group’s agenda to incorporate the broader issues of social 
inequality, public health, and foreign aid.129 These changes occurred in tandem with 
programmatic developments within IPPNW and the BMA and mirrored a general 
trend amongst British NGOs. At its Fourth World Congress in 1984, IPPNW started 
to widen its agenda to include the study of weapons of mass destruction more 
broadly.130 The fact that IPPNW amended its constitution the following year, referring 
to itself now as a “‘non-partisan’” rather than a “‘non-political’” organization, 
appeared to sanction the release of stronger value statements from MCANW.131  
The BMA, too, seemingly legitimized MCANW’s development into a multi-
issue campaign with stronger political views. In 1984, its annual representative 
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meeting overrode its previous decision to abstain from issuing political statements, 
calling instead for a world-wide re-allocation of defense to health service budgets. But 
the fact that the BMA framed this anti-militarist argument multilaterally was aimed at 
making it more acceptable to its membership base with its diverse political 
leanings.132 And this move illustrates the limits of the association in adopting a more 
politically minded approach. 
In September 1985, MCANW combined these lines of development in its first 
national campaign. “Treatment Not Trident” called on the British government to shelf 
its plans for procuring the Trident nuclear weapons system and to divert these funds 
toward health care and foreign aid.133 These developments not only demonstrate how, 
by the early 1980s, transnational professional anti-nuclear weapons activism had 
shifted since the late 1940s, but how it continued to shift in the mid-1980s. 
Conclusions 
A comparative analysis of the ASA’s and MCANW’s efforts to prevent nuclear war at 
two pivotal moments of the Cold War exposes major shifts in transnational 
professional activism, thus revealing key aspects of the roles that professionals played 
in anti-nuclear weapons activism. The threat of nuclear war provided the abstract 
contextual frame of their activities. While the two groups ostensibly shared similar 
moral regimes to avert atomic war, based on their occupational roles in the 
preparations for nuclear warfare, their moral regimes differed in fact significantly, 
depending on the particular Cold War context in which they acted. 
The ASA promoted the international control of nuclear energy to avoid a 
nuclear arms race and, ultimately, nuclear war during a transformative period for 
transnational professional activism: the United States held a monopoly on nuclear 
weapons, many scientists still attempted to make sense of atomic arms, and the notion 
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of the “nuclear taboo” only started to emerge. The ASA’s views on nuclear arms 
mirrored that embryonic state of the notion of the non-use of nuclear weapons, as the 
association did not categorically object to the existence of nuclear weapons and the 
concept of nuclear deterrence. Moreover, the ASA’s engagement with transnational 
networks was still relatively rudimentary, displaying elements of a predominantly 
pro-Western and anti-Communist “bipolar scientific internationalism.”  
By contrast, MCANW’s activism took place during the Second Cold War, 
which was characterized by relatively strong anti-nuclear weapons protests and an 
intensifying nuclear arms race. The group studied the medical effects of atomic 
warfare and adopted, in line with its members’ professional ethos, concepts from 
preventative medicine to the nuclear arms race. Unlike the ASA, MCANW 
challenged the concept of nuclear deterrence itself, calling for multi- and later also 
more explicitly unilateral British nuclear disarmament. In this, MCANW’s views 
partly resembled those of groups of the broader anti-nuclear weapons movement like 
CND, revealing MCANW’s stronger politicization, by comparison with the ASA.  
In their quest to prevent nuclear war, these two groups of “progressive 
professionals” relied on their professional expertise. Yet, they struggled to define the 
political. The ASA generally adhered to a strict line on objectivity in political matters 
and remained a single-issue campaign to its end in 1959.134 Therein, the association 
differed from other atomic scientists’ groups, especially the FAS, which had 
diversified its objectives by the early 1950s, and MCANW.135 Not only did MCANW 
issue relatively politicized statements, in contrast to the ASA, but, from 1984, the 
group, in conjunction with IPPNW, also started to investigate broader issues such as 
health spending in relation to defense expenditure on both nuclear and conventional 
armaments. After the end of the Cold War, MCANW took a most pragmatic step to 
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ensure its survival when the group merged with MAPW in 1992 to form the multi-
issue campaign Medical Action for Global Security (MEDACT), which remains 
Britain’s sole IPPNW affiliate to the present day.136  
Although the ASA and MCANW intended to stay clear of any political 
entanglement in order not to jeopardize their status as “professional elites,” the Cold 
War framework occasionally politicized some of their supposedly unpolitical 
statements. And, what is more, the two groups also frequently compromised their 
depoliticized approaches. The ASA clashed with the Attlee Government over its 
support of the “Baruch Plan.” Similarly, MCANW’s criticism of official planning for 
medical care in the event of nuclear war, including civil defense measures, brought 
the group into conflict with the Thatcher Government. The fact that several ASA 
members also held posts at British government research facilities and community 
physicians in MCANW were involved in civil defense planning further complicated 
the situation for these two groups.  
Finally, the two groups exposed fundamentally different levels of engagement 
with transnational networks. Through its membership in the IPPNW “federation,” an 
international NGO, with a sophisticated governance structure and established 
channels of transnational communication across two blocs, MCANW displayed a 
much deeper involvement in such networks than the ASA. In this context, the 
PCSWA marked both a key model for IPPNW and an organizational link between the 
ASA and MCANW/IPPNW; for many ASA members joined Pugwash when their 
association disbanded, and MCANW/IPPNW drew inspiration from the PCSWA. The 
fact that IPPNW (and MCANW) received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985 – only five 
years after their inception and ten years before the PCSWA – serves as an indicator of 
the relevance and high level of the transnational activism that medical professionals 
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displayed in the early 1980s by comparison with atomic scientists in the immediate 
post-war years.137  
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